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1. INTRODUCTION 
Customs and institutions play an important role in  shaping not only 
society but also economic relations within it. Yet the standard economics 
literature tends to relegate the social framework to footnotes and par- 
enthetical asides. In recent years several authors have tried to endogenize 
customs, rules, and institutions and to explore the economic consequences 
of these. This new institutional economics4 is likely to be important for 
various branches of economics and especially for the economic historian 
whose large canvas compels him to grapple with the problem of institutional 
change. These new developments could offer him a unifying method. 
Not surprisingly, the new institutional economics (NIE) has met with 
strong methodological criticism. A particularly penetrating critique is that 
of  Field (1981), who has argued that no real advance can be expected 
from NIE and that its endeavors will  soon fade into oblivion unless a 
substantial rethinking of research objectives occurs. He tries to substantiate 
this claim by  dissecting a work  which embodies the characteristics of 
this research program in its extreme form (namely North and Thomas, 
1973) but he claims that his critique applies also to the general research 
program and the theoretical tendencies which gave rise to this research 
in the first place (Field, 1981, p.  175). 
The present paper explores the potential of the method of  NIE in the 
context of economic history. It begins with a critique of Field's critique. 
Concerning the question of endogeneity, Field rightly maintains that some 
rules must be presupposed in any economic analysis and model building. 
From this he goes on to argue that some particular variables, namely 
those that are noneconomic, must be treated as parametric. We  show 
in Section 2 that such an inference is incorrect. The problem of endogeneity 
in general and in economic history in particular is also discussed. 
On the question of optimality our position tends to coincide with Field's 
rather than that of the authors he is criticizing, notably North and Thomas 
(1973) and Posner (1973). These and several other writers have maintained 
that  the institutions which exist in  a  society are the ones which  are 
efficient for that society. Drawing on some recent developments in economic 
theory, we try to show in  Section 3 that such a theorem is untenable. 
Much of the existing literature fails to treat an important cognate issue 
which should be of particular interest to historians, namely the relationship 
between structural and historical explanations. NIE tends to be structural, 
We use the phrase "new institutional economics" to refer to the work of such writers 
as Coase, Alchian, Williamson, Posner, and North (latest vintage), and to a certain extent 
Akerlof. We  prefer it  to the term  "neoclassical institutional economics" used by Field 
since neoclassicism refers paradigmatically to neoclassical growth theory and general equi- 
librium  theory to  which  NIE is  often opposed, because these theories tend  to neglect 
institutions; e.g., they consider firms as "black boxes" and this is held to lead to gross 
inadequacies (Alchian, 1984, p. 40). GROWTH AND DECAY OF CUSTOM  3 
explaining an institution as an optimal institutional solution without ref- 
erence to the past. This is the opposite of  what historians tend to do. 
We  urge in Section 4 that both structural and historical explanations are 
needed in economic history, and that these are complementary rather 
than exclusive. What is needed, therefore, is a proper assessment of the 
interplay between structural and historical forces, and NIE seems to be 
fruitful precisely because it raises this issue and thus challenges habitual 
ways of  thought, not in  the abstract but in actual analysis. However, 
neither North and Thomas nor  Posner can be  taken  as paradigmatic, 
since they are unclear with regard to this point. 
2. ENDOGENEITY 
If we  wish to explain a certain phenomenon, we take something as 
given.  Such givens are always provisional, subject to other influences 
left out of  our picture. We might fix a certain technology, certain tastes, 
certain endowments, and certain rules of  behavior for studying a single 
market  in  isolation, yet  each  of  these givens might  be endogenized. 
Neither technology, nor tastes, nor endowments, nor rules are natural 
constants. There are theories explaining technological change (Schmookler, 
1966; von Weizsacker, 1%6), tastes (Duesenbeny, 1949; von Weizsacker, 
1971), and endowments (Stiglitz, 1969; Schlicht, 1975). In this vein NIE 
extends the analysis by trying to explain rules and instituti~ns.~  Customs, 
rules, and institutions, we take it, refer to different degrees of  embodiment 
of the same thing. It is hard to draw exact boundaries between them, 
and  we  follow the literature in treating them largely  synonymously in 
the following. This is sufficient for our present purposes. 
Endogenization always proceeds by taking former givens as endogenous 
variables and starting from other givens; hence one approaches by assuming 
a certain spectrum of feasible technologies, assuming regularities in pref-. 
erence formation or, in the case of  rules, analyzing the growth or decay 
of  some while presupposing the validity of others. All these givens could 
be endogenized further. 
This Marshallian view is not incompatible with neoclassicism, as might 
appear from Field's  (1981, p.  195) assertion that "neoclassical  theory 
presupposes . . .  four  categories of  exogenous variables: tastes, tech- 
nologies, endowments, and rules"  (italics in  original).  Neoclassicists, 
like other intellectuals, properly define their work by method rather than 
by a particular model, and the neoclassical method does not entail a firm 
list of  givens. 
Wittman (1982) presents an economic analysis of rules pertainifig to traffic and sports 
activities which might illustrate the point. A very rudimentary, albeit neoclassical, attempt 
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It is true that (a) some rules must be presupposed for any economic 
discourse including the most elementary analysis of  market  problem^.^ 
Field  establishes (a) with great care.  But  having  done  so he quickly 
moves on, as if by obvious inference, to assert that (b) some particular 
rules or variables must be taken as parametrically given when building 
models. He further asserts that it is the noneconomic variables which 
constitute the base  "we  eventually ground on"  (Field, 1981, p.  193). 
We, in this paper, accept (a) and reject (b). A little reflection shows that 
this entails no contradiction. It seems reasonable to assert that all givens 
in  economic and historical analysis are provisional and ought to be en- 
dogenized if  the problem requires this and our scientific ability permits. 
There is,  short of  the laws of  nature,  no  sensible firm  starting point. 
What we might select as given and as endogenous depends on the problem 
we wish to analyze. 
There seems to be no real reason why any noneconomic variable should 
always be exempt from endogenization. The most acceptable position 
here seems to be the Marshallian one-that  the set of endogenous variables 
increases as the time span under review increases. A variable is exogenous 
to a model if it is not affected by the endogenous variables of that model. 
Whether the variable is economic or noneconomic is immaterial. It is 
possible, depending on the context, that (i) an economic variable will be 
exogenous and (ii) a noneconomic variable will be endogenous. Suppose 
we are studying the Sri Lankan economy. Conceivably its functioning 
is sensitive to the U.S. inflation rate although the U.S.  inflation rate is 
not affected by  the Sri Lankan economy. Thus it will  be legitimate to 
treat this economic variable, namely the U.S. inflation rate, as exogenous 
in our model, Concerning the endogeneity of  noneconomic variables we 
merely note that even the weather is influenced by economic development, 
for example, by the cutting down of tropical forests in the Amazon basin. 
Although the weather is taken as given in short-run analysis, we might 
gain insight into certain long-run developments by  taking the climatic 
consequences of economic development into account. 
Thus the selection of  givens involves substantive assumptions. The 
tendencies or movements which  we want  to explain should not  work 
back on our givens too strongly; retroaction of the endogenous phenomena 
on the givens should not destroy our results. Furthermore, the givens 
should be  saciently stable for the tendencies we  wish to describe to 
have had a long enough run to materialize. In short, the givens should 
be stable with regard to the processes we want to explain. This is the 
See Basu (1983,  1984, Chap.  1).  It is theoreticaliy unclear whether the market system 
can be self-enforcing in the sense of reproducing the rules underlying its functioning (Arrow, 
1972; von Weizskker, 1980, pp. 72-76) but it is quite clear that the spontaneous observation 
of rules can be observed in many cases and may also be economically advantageous insofar 
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isolation principle (Schlicht, 1985, pp. 17-21).7  We should not assume, 
for instance, that investment has no significant effect on productive ca- 
pacities in the long run, nor should we assume in a long-run model that 
tax morals remain constant while tax rates change. This methodological 
perspective can have significant implications for economic history. We 
illustrate some of  these in  the remainder of  this section and return to 
some larger issues in  Section 4. 
The first example concerns transaction costs and institutions. We  em- 
phatically agree with  Field (1981,  pp.  186-187)  that  transaction costs 
cannot be deduced from the formal incentive structure of  a particular 
set of  rules, since transaction costs are heavily dependent on morals and 
cust~m.~  Once morals and customs are treated as endogenous, however, 
the transaction costs associated with a particular institution may depend 
on its history.  Switching, say, directly from guild organization to the 
modern firm might have been inefficient because of prohibitive problems 
of  enforcement. It may  on the other hand have been efficient to switch 
from the guild system to the putting-out system, and then to the modern 
firm. 
The second illustration concerns the role of  cultural explanations in 
economic history. The choice between economic or cultural modes  5f 
explanation involves substantive hypotheses about the relative stabilities 
of  various features of  the problem  at hand. What ought to be a given 
for one question ought to be  an endogenous variable for another, and 
vice versa. The selection of givens is, hence, not a matter of classification 
(whether something is economic or not) but rather a result of  reasoned 
hypotheses about interactions among the various factors involved. 
Cultural explanations often refer, for example, to certain customs which 
determine how people behave. But these customs themselves are often 
changing as a result of  economic changes. Cultural explanations often 
imply a degree of  concreteness and stability that may  be present in the 
language describing them but as far as the content of  customs goes is 
being eroded by economic forces. Marshall saw this clearly: 
Sometimes these forces break down the custom altogether; but often they evade 
it by gradual and imperceptible changes in the character of the thing sold so that 
the purchaser gets a new thing at the old price under an old name. .  . . But in 
fact  the  payments  and dues,  which  custom  is  supposed  to stereotype, nearly 
always contain elements which are incapable of precise definition; whik the accounts 
of them handed down by tradition are embodied in loose and vague impressions, 
or at best are expressed in words that make no attempt at scientific exactness. 
We can watch the influence of this vagueness in the agreements between landlord 
-- 
'  Field (1981, p.  195, note 23) alludes to this requirement but does not draw the conclusions 
for the argument that must follow. 
North (1984,1985) has recently taken explicit account of this by referring to "ideofogy," 
and Williamson (1975) captures it by "atmosphere." BASU, JONES, AND SCHLICHT 
and tenant even in modern  England; for they have always been interpreted  by 
the aid of customs, which have ever been imperceptibly growing and dwindling 
again, to meet the changing exigencies of successive  generation^.^ 
A cultural explanation may therefore be valid in the short run, but this 
does not imply that it is also valid in the long run. 
If  a custom, say one of paying certain dues, actually adapts to scarcity, 
"rounding  off  the edges of  change"  (Marshall,  1920, p.  641), then an 
economic treatment of the dues as implicit prices might be adequate in 
long-run analysis. A "culturalist"  opposite to this "economistic"  case 
would be a theory of autonomous cultural development explaining prices 
as, perhaps, implicit communications to which economic forces adapt. 
No  convincing cultural theory  of  this type  seems to  have  appeared. 
Indeed, both custom and economic forces may be essential for certain 
explanations. Assume, for example, that a certain custom (honesty, per- 
haps) leads to economic growth, but that economic growth destroys the 
custom. Taking the custom as parametric may  lead  to the erroneous 
conclusion that its decay (less honesty) impedes economic growth." 
Clearly rules, like those concerning honesty, and economic processes 
interact in  this manner. This renders  doubtful the position  that  rules 
logically antedate the market, insofar as it is intended to suggest that 
the alleged logical priority has causal significance.''  In a more recent 
essay Field (1984) has written lucidly about these issues, illustrating them 
with a very interesting account of the role of language in market behavior. 
However, a deeper search of evidence shows that his position is vulnerable. 
By  no means is it evident that language is indispensable for economic 
activity. There seem to have been numerous cases of  "silent  trade"  in 
which arriving merchants left goods in a clearing and retreated into the 
bush while lacal inhabitants inspected the goods, took what they wanted, 
and in tun  left some native products. Herodotus described Phoenicians 
engaging in the "dumb  barter"  of  salt for gold on the coast of  Guinea 
2000  years ago:  a  small initial risk, much  tatonnement,  a lot of  trade, 
no language. Neutral ports of trade, strategically located, arose to service 
the meetings of  strangers on foreign coasts with which commerce had 
begun (Polanyi, 1966, p. 99). The  inhabitant,^ of cities shut in because 
of the plague reverted to silent trade with farmers, leaving payment in 
Marshall (1920, pp.  559-560,  638). 
'O  A "materialistic"  position,  to continue drawing these caricatures, would  entail the 
"econornistic"  argument plus the explanation of  the decay in custom as resulting from 
economic growth. As one may easily see, it has the same status as the culturalist position. 
" One could argue that the notion of a market "logically antedates"  the rules governing 
market behavior, or more generally that the content of the rules-their  intended application- 
logically antedates the rules. But all these logical statements are, it seems to us, produced 
merely by the way we phrase the problem rather than  by  the properties of the subject 
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a vinegar bath outside the gates in return for food, apparently without 
verbal communication. There is a plaque outside West Gate, Winchester, 
recording an episode of  this kind.  If  it be objected that prices would 
have been known initially, then we  suggest that they were not likely to 
hold firm in the circumstances, and a voiceless adjustment is quite possible. 
What happens when speech is possible, there is no common language, 
and the prospect is held .out of future commerce? The answer is that 
"people seem to come equipped with whatever is required for negotiating 
a linguistic contract when they do not share a language"  (Sankoff, 1980, 
p.  157).  What happens is the emergence of  a lingua franca,  a pidgin, 
"by  definition the native language of nobody"  (MuMhausler, as quoted 
by  Sankoff, 1980, p.  146). Pidgins are generated as plantation languages, 
slave and nonslave, and where nonnative labor is employed in mines, 
but they are most usual as trade languages, though they are to be dis- 
tinguished from simplified trade languages (also common) which adhere 
too closely  to one or the other user's  language to qualify  strictly as 
pidgins. Innumerable such tongues have been constructed in the course 
of  exploration and trade, from Chinook Jargon to Tok Pisin, from the 
Sino-Russian  of  the Tsarist-Ching  fur mart at Kiakhta to the Sabir (or 
Sabirs) of  the medieval and later Mediterranean, Adriatic, Black  Sea, 
Levant, and Saharan oases. Sabir was a go-between language described 
as  linguafranca, used by Latins, Arabs, and later Turks, and illustrating 
fusion of more local variants and other transformations (Schuchardt, in 
Gilbert,  1980). The variety of  these languages and  their  rise and fall 
shows nicely that culture in this respect is not to be taken as necessarily 
prior to economic action. Language is a great convenience, but it is not 
absolutely essential and has very often been manufactured by economic 
requirement. A study of methods for coping in lingua franca  talk, sig- 
nificantly entitled "On the Non-Fatal Nature of Trouble," indeed stresses 
that people who may lack competence in their own language "nevertheless 
turn out to be experts in locating, avoiding, replacing, fixing, ignoring, 
taking about and otherwise dealing with troubles arising in such situations'" 
(Jordan and Fuller, 1975, p.  11). 
Under somewhat more stable circumstances than have attended the 
formation of many pidgins there will perhaps have been an attempt to 
learn the trader's language, perhaps bastardizing it, rather than for the 
native language to be learned. As Sankoff (1980, p. 157) says, the most 
likely explanation of this "has to do with the relative power of the traders 
in controlling access to valued goods."  Culture, meaning language, is in 
any case a doubtful bottom on which to ground in a world with such a 
convergence on English as the lingua franca  of  internationd trade and 
technology, and a convergence on certain computer languages. Conver- 
gence dominates such wasteful, but relatively minor, discrepancies as 
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question is not whether cultural phenomena may be economically derived- 
they often are-but  how to specify whether the structural forces in a 
given case will be strong enough (whether the invested capital or human 
capital is too large?) to impede an economically efficient solution.'* 
The desire to trade is, after all, strong. It is not self-evident that the 
natural state is a Hobbesian war of one against all, rather than one which 
sees the benefits of  trade  and  the pleasures of  fresh human  contact. 
Codicts are not indisputably primary.  Many  (like the cannibals'  war 
against Man Friday) are derivative in that the aggression seems to have 
been learned, not au naturel, but out of particular circumstances. John 
Plamenatz makes a parallel point (quoted by Barry, 1978, p.  176): "Man 
is not just an animal who, unlike the others, is provident and calculating 
. . .  men . . .  are not mere competitors, however benevolent, in a market 
for the supply of personal wants; they are members of  society, and their 
hopes and feelings, both for themselves and others, would not be what 
they are apart from their group loyalties." 
There are many instances of  trade by  the private citizens of  nations 
at war. Which then comes first, the individual desire to truck and barter 
or the collective desire to fight? Trade, without doubt, is strongly impelled 
by  differences in factor endowments that lead it to promise great gains 
for both parties. The task is to specify just when, and when not, people 
transact or fight,  since neither trade nor martial theft seems logically 
prior. That rules must first exist to get trade established is simply not 
documented. We are not inexorably required to take language or common 
commercial rules as prerequisites of analysis and to do so may distract 
us from the true conditions under which economic activity began. 
NIE is on the right track in trying to endogenize institutions or customs. 
It offers a method which tries to give an adequate account of  process, 
instead of  assuming some parametric variation in things both cultural 
and economic which are essentially endogenous. However, the means 
by  which this is attempted-ideas  about competitive selection of  rules 
and institutions-is  open to  serious doubts.  The purpase  of  the next 
section is to raise some of  these. 
rield's  (1981)  critique of  what  he labels  '-neoclassical institutional 
 economic^"'^ is somewhat blunted by the fact that it is an undifferentiated 
criticism. He groups under this label the entire methodology of  Posner 
(1973) and North and Thomas (1973) and attempts a uniform demolition. 
I*  (5f. Paul David (1985) on the retention of Qwerty keyboards. For an extension of the 
analysis of the  conditions  of increasing return  uader which a technology  may become 
locked in, see W.  Brian Arthur (1984). 
l3  Which, in this paper, is being referred to as the new institutional economics. GROWTH AND DECAY OF CUSTOM  9 
We  urge on the contrary that it is crucial to realize that the Posner- 
North-Thomas  approach treats institutions as (a) endogenous and (b) 
socially optimal. The kinds of  criticism that can be leveled against en- 
dogeneity and optimality are often distinct and it is possible for a critic 
to go along with one and resist the other. That is what we  do in this 
paper. 
We have argued that there is nothing wrong, in principle, with treating 
institutions  as endogenous. Though we may have doubts  about the particular 
efforts of  Posner and  of  North  and  Thomas, their methodology  here 
cannot be faulted. Optimality is another matter. It is not obvious that 
the institutions-social,  political, or legal-which  exist are necessarily 
optimal. Of course they may be, but that conclusion cannot be clinched 
by merely citing the theorems of  neoclassical economics. The optimality 
of  institutions is the subject matter of  this section and it will be argued 
that no such broad claim as is generally made in the ME can be maintained. 
Our position on this is thus similar to Field's, although the arguments 
are distinct. 
Individuals  choose in  the marketplace, in  shops, in  labor  markets. 
They do not choose between  institutions, customs, and social norms. 
These evolve in response to a multitude of  individual decisions spread 
over dgerent domains and large stretches of time. Standard neoclassical 
economics deals with choice in the marketplace and shows that, given 
certain conditions, individual rational decisions Lead  to optimality. That, 
too, is a very special kind of  optimality, namely, a situation where it is 
not possible to make anybody better off  without making someone else 
worse off.I4 To claim the optimality of  social institutions by  citing the 
above argument from neoclassical economic theory, which applies to the 
limited domain of market exchange, entails a trespass which needs much 
greater justification than is provided by the protagonists of  the NIE. In 
what follows we argue that such a venture is likely to be futile. 
The explanation of  a  social institution or a custom consists of  two 
tasks: we have to explain its persistence and its origin, These are very 
different questions. Both are difficult problems, but some recent research 
in economic theory throws interesting light on the persistence question 
l4  This view of  optimality, namely Pareto optimality, has very little substance where 
the main problem  is that of distribution.  Suppose two individuals are trying to share a 
cake. What is a Pareto optimal distribution? That each gets haif? That one gets one-fourth 
and the other three-fourths? As a little reflection shows, all distributions are Pareto optimal. 
This is because no matter how the cake is cut to start with, if  one tries to give more to 
one person, then one has to give less to the other. Thus not only does this view of optimality 
fail to give us a unique rule or distribution, as in the above, it can declare everything to 
be optimal. The claim that "If  a set of rules is Pareto efficient. .  .it will be introduced" 
(see Field, 1981, p, 185) may be quite meaningless since it presupposes the uniqueness of 
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(in particular, Akerlof, 1976). What Akerlof's  work demonstrates is a 
purely logical possibility but it bears important implications for the issue 
we are considering. His work shows that it is possible for an institution 
to persist even though no individual benefits from this. That is, although 
everybody is worse off as a consequence of  the institution, it is rational 
for each  individual to  comply with  its norms because of  a  mutually 
sustaining structure of sanctions. Each individual fears violating the norm 
for fear of being ostracized. Those who do the ostracizing do so because 
they fear that if  they do not ostracize those who violate the norms of 
society, then they themselves  will  be  ostracized or will  have to face 
social censure. 
It is important to appreciate this argument fully. Consider the Hindu 
custom of widowhood. As soon as a traditional Hindu woman is widowed 
she begins to wear coarse white saris, ceases to eat nonvegetarian food, 
and generally leads a frugal and secluded life. Why  do women comply 
with this painful institution? While it is possible that some do so in the 
hope of compensation in the next life, most widows comply because of 
social sanctions and fear of ostracism. To complete a description of this 
situation, we need to explain why others would  ostracize widows who 
did  not comply. The reason is the same: while for a widow to lead a 
life of indulgence is wrong, it is also wrong to condone such indulgence.I5 
What is interesting about this argument is that compliance with this 
custom is individually rational ceteris paribus. Of  course in reality we 
seldom get such extreme examples, but what the above theory implies 
is that some individuals may be worse off  because of  custom. Hence 
the institution cannot be optimal. Thus we have established that a custom, 
once it has come into existence, may persist even though it is socially 
suboptimal (and even though it is rational for each individual to conform 
to it). 
While North has modified his earlier position somewhat, his argument 
on  the optimality of  institutions remains contrary to ours (see North, 
1981, p.  7).  We  have just  shown that even with  atomistically rational 
behavior, there is no assurance that socially inefficient institutions will 
automatically get dislodged. Further, contrary to Posner's (1981) suggestion, 
the fact that an agent or group benefits from a particular institution does 
''  This argument can be extended to encompass political issues such as the survival of 
unwanted regimes and the power and influence of some undesired men and political parties 
(Havel, 1985; Basu, 1986). It may be worthwhile cautioning that for lucidity and emphasis 
these models consider polar cases. They should not be taken to suggest a complete invincibility 
of customs once established. Indeed it is possible, in principle, to COnStNCt more elaborate 
models which can explain the genesis or the decay of customs. Though we do not have 
a formal theory to offer along these lines, some broad analysis and historical illustrations 
are presented in the next section. GROWTH AND DECAY OF CUSTOM  I I 
not mean that the agent or group is the cause of it.l6 Every time a person 
dies, if  we  hold  all those who  benefit  by  this as responsible for the 
person's  death, then we  would  have  a  very  disconcerting system of 
police. It is this fallacy which has led many writers in the NIE tradition 
and some sociological functionalists to foster the myth that the origins 
of institutions can be easily identified by  referring to their consequences. 
We have not yet shown how suboptimal institutions come into being. 
This is where the question of  persistence links up with the question of 
origin. What is fortunate is that a link is possible even without a full- 
fledged theory of origin. Let us assume what would be the most favorable 
theory of  the origins of  institutions from the point of  view of Posner and 
of  North and Thomas, namely, that an institution comes into existence 
when it is socially needed. Necessity is the mother not only of invention 
but also of  institutions. This means that in  its nascency an institution 
will  indeed be socially optimal.17 But over long tracts of  history what 
was  once a necessity  need  not  always be  so. We  have demonstrated 
above that institutions, once brought into existence, may  persist. Thus 
at a particular time  in  a particular economy, there may  exist lots of 
institutions which serve no social purpose and which, though once valuable 
to soeiety, may  now be actually harmful. They persist because of  mutually 
sustaining networks of  social sanctions. 
Since we have derived this under the assumption most congenial to 
the position of  Posner and of  North and Thomas, our criticism is made 
stronger. After  all, it is not really clear that institutions do germinate 
out of  social needs.  We  do not have a th~ory  of  the origins of  social 
customs, which is a vast topic and quite beyond the scope of  this paper, 
What we have shown is that even if  institutions germinate out of needs, 
it is possible that many will be inefficient and suboptimal. Of course, if 
institutions emerge despite there being no social need for them, at any 
given date even more are likely to be suboptimal. Conversely, if institutions 
for which  there is a need  fail to emerge, society may  be  doomed  to 
inefficiency. For example, if  an institution could be developed to ensure 
that loans were always repaid, then credit markets would be vastly more 
efficient; but there is no a priori reason why individual rationality would 
result in  such an institution. Indeed the fragmented credit markets of 
backward agrarian economies suggest that the emergence of  such insti- 
tutions is not automatic. 
l6  There is in fact an ambiguity in Posner's (1981, Chap. 7) treatment of optimality as 
he has a tendency to appeal sometimes to individual rationality and sometimes to groap 
rationality. 
" There  is, however, a problem  here. Inefficient  institutions might  grow  faster than 
optimal institutions, perhaps too quickly (Schlicht,  1984a),  and the  selection argument 
might not necessarily lead to optimal institutions. It might lead, as it were, to maximal 
rather than optimal growth. North and Thomas (1973, p. 2) as wetl as North (1981, p. 6) 
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In concluding this section, it is worth noting that in dismantling the 
optimality argument of NIE we have escaped trapping ourselves in  a 
paradox. If  everything that happens or exists is optimal, then both of 
the following policies would constitute an unwarranted interference: 
(i) The imposition of a tare, 
(ii) The removal of  a tariff. 
Such a paralysis of  action would strike everywhere. We would not be 
able to argue for more government or for less. We would have to claim 
that the custom of  Hindu widowhood is desirable if  it exists, and if  it 
does not, then we would have to describe it as undesirable. This is a 
strange normative stance-strange  but not, in itself, paradoxical. The 
paradox crops up once we recognize that policy changes do occur in 
reality, whereas if all policymakers submitted to this argument then no 
policy change would ever occur. 
4. INERTIA 
There are two main types of explanation of  the forms of  institutions 
in economic history which may be called structural and inertial. While 
these are not truly mutually exclusive, their points of  emphasis differ. 
The former sees institutions as essentially the outcome of  competing 
forces, and the latter sees them as the products of their origins or history. 
When neoclassical economists and those economic historians who are 
most openly in that tradition try to explain institutions, their approach 
tends to be structural. The current balance of forces is seen as responsible 
for the institution"  existence; former balances are seen as having held 
in place the institutions of  any given past period. The logic is close to 
the Coase (1937) position that every institution is such that no additional 
advantage is to be gained (because of  transaction costs) by any further 
change in rules or behavior, and is consistent with the Hicks/d'Alembert 
principle that every movement or state may be thought of as an  equilibrium 
movement or state balancing one set of tendencies against a set of coun- 
tertendencies."  Without that, the institution would change faster in one 
or other direction, ultimately breaking up or swelling into a giant. 
Presumably as a result, there is little examination of  the origins and 
evolution of institutions. These matters seem to be regarded as minor 
(formally, of  no  significance)  compared  with the forces acting at the 
moment under review.  This is very different from the approach of  the 
historically minded, who feel called on to trace the evolution of institutions 
from one moment to the next and to provide accounts of institutiond 
emergence, on the working principle that earlier states account for later 
ones. No doubt the lack of deep historical treatment is one reason why 
general historians mostly ignore neoinstitutional economic history. 
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More seriously, the limited "realistic"  treatment presented by  many 
economists minimizes the informal, but powerful, historicd test to which 
such thinking ought to be subjected. Richness of  detail smoothiy borne 
is inherently desirable ~JI  an historical study and may  be thought of  as 
equivalent to the elegance for which mathematicians seek.19 This is not 
just a superficial aesthetic concern. The alternative ("theorist's history") 
may  mean an uncontrolled  selection of  episodes that seem compatible 
with some model or another. Consecutive study of  institutions through 
time puts afar greater, and more salutary, strain on the writer's command 
of  context and evidence. The theorist is usually as overextended by this 
as is the historian in a theory field. There may  be more point than at 
first meets the eye to the redundancy in much historical research. 
There are other reasons why stereotyped neoclassical explanations are 
seldom fully convincing. The assumption that institutions are necessarily 
optimal in the sense intended by the logic seems implausible in the face 
of a profusion of cultural variants and the evidence of horrendous distortions 
of  lives at the hands of  many  institutions created by  man.  Arguments 
that any institution must satisfy a maximizing principle for the individuals 
involved are not very convincing on descriptive grounds, whether or not 
an economistic rationalization can be found. 
Intuitively it is unreasonable to think of  institutions as if  they were 
selected de novo at every date from a sheaf of  blueprints and to ignore 
their origins and the ways by  which they have arrived at their present 
state. Economic considerations may explain institutional scale, survival, 
and functioning, but that is like deducing the cost of  keeping animals in 
a zoo and not explaining why  we have those particular animals rather 
than some others. Kenneth Arrow gives as  an example of  facts that 
cannot be deduced by  theory the resource gains from the Discoveries. 
No doubt the Discoveries were investment enterprises, but the results: 
were determined by "the brute, though unknown, facts of geography."20 
There also seems no reason to suppose a priori that competitive pressures 
are always sufficient to break up less than optimal institutions. A wide 
range of  examples may fall in a tolerable range, and survive, that do not 
satisfy conditions of  optimality.  We  may  also  suspect that ergodicity 
matters in the history of institutions as elsewhere in the real world, i.e,, 
that final  states may  be independent of  initial states. At  the opposite 
extreme, arbitrary initial choices of  institutional forms may  sometimes 
behave as small perturbations swirling unpredictabIy to great size, as 
shown in  chaos theory.21  Whether there are realms of  human activity 
l9  Jones (1984, p. 1152). For a criticism of North and Thomas for omission on the same 
lines, see Jones (1974, pp. 116-1 17). 
Arrow (1969, p. 35). 
'I  This point was made in diierent terms by Bauer in his review article on Hicks, A 
Theory of Economic History (1971, pp. 163-179).  See also Schlicht (1985,  pp. 95-96). 14  BASU, JONES, AND SCHLICHT 
more liable  to chaotic disturbance than others is largely unexplored. 
Structural explanation is on firmer ground where it can be shown that 
different initial choices of  institutions have converged over time on a 
single type which fulfills the one function, thus making the original choice 
unimportant compared with the forces balancing the later functions. 
The contrary, historian's,  approach attributes the existing set of  in- 
stitutions to their origin or history as if that explained their persistence. 
This is argument by  inertia, in the sense of  changelessness. There is 
nothing truly explanatory in this, no guide to telling just what will survive 
or why eventual decay comes precisely when it does. Yet the procedure 
is surprisingly common. 
To take an example, a massive range of later, even present-day, cir- 
cumstances in the Middle East is sometimes attributed to the Mongol 
invasions of  the 13th century. This view is badly stated by Alessandro 
Bausani,  whose opinion is that  the Iranian population remained  30% 
nomadic at the end of  the  19th century and remains backward today 
because the nomad invasions halted pre-Mongol  development^.^^ He even 
notes that some cities were larger before the Mongols came than they 
are now. "Though it would be an exaggeration and over-simplification," 
Bausani remarks,  "to  attribute to the Mongol  catastrophe and to the 
Turco-Mongol  invasions in general, Islam's decadence and inability to 
evolve after its initial auspicious leap forward, there is no doubt that the 
earlier collaboration and fusion that  obtained  in  Iran  after the  Arab 
conquest was  culturally more productive than  that  in  Iran under the 
~ongols."" Luc Kwanten is more emphatic about the effects but a little 
less ambitious about the duration of the hangover: "It was not until well 
into the reign of  the Safavids, some three hundred years later, that the 
dire consequences of the Mongol ifivasion began to disappear.""  The 
general form of  such arguments is clear enough. Certain striking early 
changes, though not others, are held to have had enduring consequences. 
The frequency with which the inertia argument is made, even at the 
whole society level, makes it surprising that the mechanisms by which 
it is supposed to operate are seldom spelled out. We  might try to save 
the  Mongol  invasion  hypothesis  by  suggesting  that  second-order 
effects built  in a subsequent conservatism via political or religious in- 
stitutions, but this does little more than restate the thesis."  Why  the 
conservatism? Some structure might be given to the argument by suggesting 
that conservative institutions were  established to acquire and defend 
shares of the limited share of GNP left to the populace by the invaders, 
"  Bausani (1971, pp. 93, 124). 
"  Bausani (1971, pp.  122-123. 
24  Kwanten (1979, p. 215). 
"  A suggestion that churches first became powerful secular forces in China, the Near 
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but this still fails to explain why the institutions were not dissolved after 
the invaders had merged with the locals or left. We are driven back to 
structural forces which went on maintaining institutions founded during 
the Mongol period.  "If we find that short-term cost/benefit considerations 
constantly favoured the observed very long-term pattern . . .  we  shall 
have no need to rely on the postulate of  cultural persistence, over un- 
specified periods, changeable by  no predicted  shift of  incentives, and 
therefore incapable of  explaining change when it did come.'"6 
The difficulty with  this is  determining in  historical instances, from 
actual evidence, just  what  the ratios of  current and future costs and 
benefits associated with an institution were and were expected to become. 
As Field (1981, pp. 187, 190) correctly points out, the North and Thomas 
style of  explanation comes down to asserting that institutions will not 
change so long as "conservative principles prevail,"  i.e., so long as the 
overhead costs associated with a new institution are expected to be above 
those associated with an existing institution (and these must also not be 
expected to rise).27  At the level of historical analysis presented by North 
and Thomas, or "theorist's  history,"  episodes tend to be depicted as 
compatible with the appropriate costlbenefit ratio on the most general 
grounds, without rigorous or extended historical, and especially quan- 
titative, warranting. Yet this need not always mean that the approach- 
the appeal to conservatism or its opposite-must be fruitless. 'Tn the 
absence of  scientific history,"  as Marshall (1920, p.  640) said, "short- 
lived man has little better means of ascertaining whether custom is quietly 
changing, than that the fly, born today and dead tomorrow, has of watching 
the growth of  the plant on which it rests." 
Perhaps the greatest dependence on the inertia thesis is found in the 
Hartz thesis.28  In this the stunted societal development of  former European 
colonies like the United States and Australia is attributed to their separation 
from the continuing evolution of thought in Europe. New worlds spinning 
off in space, they supposedly develop only along lines already laid down 
in Europe by  some early, formative juncture in their history. Each is a 
fragment of Europe, a living fossil. "The Australian social adult of today 
is prefigured in the social embryo of  yesteryear."29 Yet, given printing 
and the international mails, the entry of  new ideas was not blocked; it 
26  Jones (1981, p. 14). 
'' For a  similar point with respect to the indeterminacy of change where North and 
Thomas infer the cost/benefit position from a lack of change-"conservatism"--or  change 
itself, see Jones (1974, p.  123). 
Hartz (Ed.) (1964, p. 14). A very recent case of argument by inertia is a work criticized 
by Herr (1985, pp. 613-614) for finding remote origins of economic hindmnces in contemporary 
Spain (e.g., "feudal"  agriculture) whereas these things have in reality changed in Spain 
as elsewhere. 
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must have been a limited absorptive capacity of  institutions themselves 
in the new lands that blunted their response to what Hartz calls "the 
stimulus to change."30 But that would depend on a social theory, not 
articulated, predicting that institutions in European colonies must suffer 
from inertia ("a  kind of immobility," says Hartz) whatever the stimulus. 
Subsequent equilibrium forces are made to seem entirely secondary, 
There certainly are problems of several kinds with the inertia approach. 
One is the false homogenization of institutions, which were often quite 
different in function from time to time and place to place, produced by 
attaching the same name to them. Scholars are prone to overlabeling of 
this kind; the indiscriminate use of the terms "feudalism"  and "capitalism" 
are the classic cases. Consider how empty a seeming continuity can be 
with an illustration from the English open field system. At Yarnton Mead, 
Oxfordshire, the ceremony of  drawing lots for strips of  hay was  still 
carried out every July through the 1960s. Holly wood balls inscribed with 
the Saxon names of  the rights were drawn from a bag, the tread was 
run, the strip marked with the year's owner's initials cut in the turf, and 
there followed some weeks when the hay might,  and indeed must, be 
carried. But none of the farmers who continued the ceremony wanted 
or used the hay; it was sold to Oxford hospitds to feed the rabbits used 
in experiments. Antique though the ceremony undoubtedly was, its true 
content had  evaporated alonn with the agricultural economy that  had 
originally spawned it. 
Sometimes the scholar can trace changes m  content through the internal 
evidence of  the wot'ding  of  documents. Property deeds from colonial 
Vermont transfer land between husbandmen and yeomen, terms retained 
by  folk memory even though they ceased to have precise meaning in 
America. In Vermont some of the archaic legalisms relating to land can 
therefore be watched as they become mere proprieties, sanctioning trans- 
actions yet without the original or even an exact meaning in the New 
World. An attempt to hang on to meaning was the rather desperate use 
of a half-remembered "free  simple"  (sic, for "fee  simple")  to assimilate 
Vermont titles ta the more secure New Hampshire (rather than the less 
secure. New York) ones in the early 1770s.~' 
Apparently timeless institutions thus change and decay beneath their 
surface forms. Although changes in content are hard to spot given the 
gaps and formal repetitiveness of  primary documents, this means that 
history is an imperfect guide to the later purpose and effect of institutions. 
Even what seems to be the most immutable institution of all, the Indian 
30  Hartz (Ed.). (1964, p. 3). 
" We  owe the colonial examples to Jonathan hugnes (personal communication). See 
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caste system, has cleady begun to change, and what is more it is consciousiy 
manipulated by the powerful rather than held inviolate by  traditi~n.'~ 
Many of the references to inertia are unconscious reflexes on the part 
of  historians. There seems to be a working rule, rather than a developed 
system of ideas, which implies that origin or history necessarily contain 
within themselves an explanation of  whatever comes after. To a large 
extent this is misleading, an appeal less to history in the sense of  the 
forces at work than merely to the past, to antiquity as such. Rationalization 
is evident here, unconstrained by rules as to what parts of  the past will 
matter. This is nowhere more evident than in genealogy, with its massive 
overemphasis on tracing the male line and on the more remote ancestors 
whose blood in reality matters least. Jack Fisher dealt with this in his 
LSE inaugural lecture, when  he noted  that one of  the most  pathetic 
stories of  the 16th century was of  Lord Burghleigh's  attempt to trace 
his descent from a Welsh princeling "who  probably never existed and 
who, if he did exist, was probably hardly distinguishable from the sheep 
of  his native hills."33 
Having said this and although languages do often respond to economic 
necessities (as we have discussed), we are still entitled to believe that 
there are senses in which history does matter, where there is real stickiness 
of  content as well as form. Were this not the case, the Qukbecois would 
speak English. Without a particular history, certainly, there could be no 
explaining why their minority language is French, or why any minority 
cultural choices around the world are the ones that we  see them to be. 
The Welsh in Patagonia do not speak Urdu, the Pakistanis in Bradford 
do not  speak German, and the Russian Jews in Chicago do not  speak 
Maori, although they all speak languages which impose costs that are in 
turn balanced-probably  slightly less than balanced-by  pressures within 
each minority group. 
A characteristic way in which particular histories are said to make a 
difference is through the influence of  individual actors. From time  to 
time an economist insists that market forces will induce similar behavior 
whoever are the individuals concerned. Engels took a comparable view, 
though with a different vision of the forces involved than merely supply 
and demand. This empties much of the content out of history. The notion 
may be acceptable where the behavior of large numbers of  people is at 
stake, since this permits the pattern predictions consistent with theories 
of evolution or competition, whew we can think of individual vari~tions 
as tail-end distributions. It becomes silly where no shelter can be found 
behind a law of large numbers, where vast and complex decisions redy 
are influenced by  the preferences (and psychopathology) of great men 
3Z See especially Srinivas (1962). 
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or by single events that determine which fork of  a major decision, yes 
or no, will be chosen. As with the problem of  colligation, i.e.,  where in 
time to start a history, there is no determinate way to tell correct from 
incorrect approaches. Scholarly judgment in terms of the purpose of the 
analysis must decide whether group or individual behavior is what counted. 
All  that we can currently ask of judgments about group versus individual 
priority is that they be consistent and perhaps cany rhetorical con~iction.~~ 
Yet  another case where history matters is when  psychological and 
cultural interlinkages exist, so that if a rule is changed, then other rules 
must also be changed, but this is prohibitively costly, perpetuating "history" 
for a very long time. An  example is the Hindu custom of  widowhood 
to which we have already referred. On the face of  it a widow's  life is 
thoroughly uncongenial and it would be a merciful and profitable act to 
renegotiate the conditions. But this might  alter the  whole  meaning of 
marriage within the culture and therefore be seen as a prohibitively costly 
move.  Institutions persist,  therefore, that  might  not be  chosen afresh 
from all the available blueprints. 
In the literatures of economics, neoinstitutional economic history, and 
history that someone interested in institutions might be expected to peruse, 
two main lines of  thought  occur.  The textbook equilibrium approach 
makes little or no extended appeal to history and, while successful insofar 
as it refers to comparative statics, cannot properly account for the observed 
range of institutions, many of them probably suboptimal. The pure inertial 
approach is better at accounting for the variety of institutions, the menu 
of  choices available at past dates, but has little success (and only rarely 
makes an attempt) at explaining just what does or does not persist. 
There is no automatic permanence for some arbitrary set of  all insti- 
tutions, nor is there a moment by moment renegotiation of all the institutions 
we  observe. Surface similarities and overlabeling help historians to ex- 
aggerate the importance of beginnings. An  excessive faith in optimality 
and the omission of psychological and cultural elements from the calculus 
help economists to neglect the historical path to the present. Structural 
and historical explanations turn out to be complementary. 
Three sets of  forces, not one or two,  act on each institution: those 
tending to break it up, those tending to maintain or expand it, and those 
tracking in from the specific form of the last known position. The existence 
of  the balancing forces seems intuitively obvious to ecohomists and is 
indeed latent, though seldom specified, in many historical accounts. Yet 
the historical path is manifest, too; without taking it into consideration 
the observed range of  institutions can hardly be  explained. Although 
34  We  are  interested to note a very  recent attempt  to argue that  forensic skill is  an 
inherent, if covert, method in economics and to make it openly fashionable. See McCloskey 
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what persists may sometimes be merely a shell with new forces changing 
its functions, at other times stabilizing forces may be thought of as inertial 
since they keep an old custom intact and vital. The economic historian 
concerned with an institution needs to allow both for its origins or some 
of  its earlier positions at any rate, and for the forces acting on it. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In discussing the issues of  endogeneity, optimality, and inertia, we 
have tried to give an assessment of NIE with respect to economic history. 
Our main claim is that the NIE approach fruitfully challenges the dangerous 
tendency in historical accounts which derives from "merely  placing things 
together in a certain order, and consciously or unconsciously suggesting 
post hoc ergo propter  ho~."~'  We have argued that the choice of givens 
depends on the problem which is to be analyzed and involves substantive 
hypotheses about the subject matter rather than taste for a particular 
intellectual tradition. We have argued too that the question of optimality 
is largely unclear in  NIE chiefly because the tendencies and obstacles 
to optimality need to be spelled out in the case at hand. It needs to be 
stated why individual rationality or the formation of custcm may or may 
not lead to efficiency improvements. A gross application of the "invisible 
hand paradigm without proof  is certainly  misleading in institutional 
analysis. Finally, we have urged that a proper blending of  structural ancl 
historical arguments is needed. Although little more is known today about 
the growth and decay of  customs than Marshall knew, we  should not 
dismiss the questions raised by  the new institutional economics merely 
because we  are not always satisfied by  the answers so far obtained, 
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